The Hudson Institute has published the second in its series of papers resulting from its recent conference on the Muslim Brotherhood. In this paper, Israeli Professor Israel Elad-Altman addresses the recent controversy sparked by NIxon Center’s Robert Leiken’s recent article for Foreign Affairs arguing that the U.S. should change it’s policy and “enrage” with the Muslim Brotherhood. Altman begins by posing the question of whether or not the Brotherhood has fundamentally changed as a result of it participation in the political process:
Perhaps the most important ideological development in the recent history of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement has been its adoption of participatory politics as a major strategy. This engagement in the electoral process has been accompanied by a new democratic narrative that promotes the creation of a “civil state” and, in some cases, Brotherhood-formed political parties. It has been argued that Islamist movements would be moderated by integrating them into the political process, and radicalized by being excluded. Has the MB’s track record lent credence to this hypothesis? Has its participation in politics and in elections been accompanied by a fundamental ideological change? Has it changed the nature and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)?
In both Egypt and Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to participate in electoral politics as a strategy for assuming power has not been accompanied by changes in its ideology or objectives. The MB continues to be committed to the creation of an Islamic state, which it still seeks to accomplish through dawa. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Egyptian MB’s party program calls for a state ruled by sharia.The innovation behind the MB’s new political strategy is not its rejection of its basic ideology, nor its abandonment of dawa in favor of participatory politics. Rather, what is new is the way the MB now seeks to institutionalize its rule—namely, through an assembly of jurists. That may help explain, incidentally, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s professed solidarity with Iran. Not only does the MB approve of Iran’s anti-American and anti-Israeli positions, but it is also in basic ideological sympathy with the radical Shi’a concept of the Islamic state. From the MB’s point of view, Islamic parties like Turkey’s AKP represent an adjustment to new global realities and a desire to integrate into the global system. By contrast, the Iranian regime, like the MB, rejects the current world order, and seeks to construct an alternative world order in which Islam reigns supreme within Muslim countries.
He goes on to examine the Egyptian and Jordanian cases in detail before concluding that the Brotherhood has not changed its aims:
In both Egypt and Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to participate in electoral politics as a strategy for assuming power has not been accompanied by changes in its ideology or objectives. The MB continues to be committed to the creation of an Islamic state, which it still seeks to accomplish through dawa. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Egyptian MB’s party program calls for a state ruled by sharia. The innovation behind the MB’s new political strategy is not its rejection of its basic ideology, nor its abandonment of dawa in favor of participatory politics. Rather, what is new is the way the MB now seeks to institutionalize its rule—namely, through an assembly of jurists. That may help explain, incidentally, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s professed solidarity with Iran. Not only does the MB approve of Iran’s anti-American and anti-Israeli positions, but it is also in basic ideological sympathy with the radical Shi’a concept of the Islamic state. From the MB’s point of view, Islamic parties like Turkey’s AKP represent an adjustment to new global realities and a desire to integrate into the global system. By contrast, the Iranian regime, like the MB, rejects the current world order, and seeks to construct an alternative world order in which Islam reigns supreme within Muslim countries.